This paper decomposes nominal Treasury yields into expected real rates, expected inflation rates, real risk premiums, and inflation risk premiums by separately calibrating a threefactor affine term structure model to the nominal Treasury and TIPS yield curves. Although this particular application seems to produce expected real short rates and inflation rates that are somewhat static, there are theoretical advantages to calibrating the model to nominal and real yields separately. Moreover, the estimates correlate positively with back-of-the-envelope measures of the inflation risk premium. With respect to the current environment, monetary policy uncertainty does not seem to have contributed to the apparent increase in the inflation risk premium since the beginning of 2006. Also, in purely nominal terms, the increase in term premiums thus far this year might be just as much a global as a domestic phenomenon, given that nominal term premiums have also increased in Germany and the United Kingdom.
Introduction
This paper outlines an estimate of the inflation risk premium based on a threefactor Gaussian term structure model of both the nominal U.S. Treasury and TIPS yield curves. Model calibration to the nominal and real yield curves separately produces estimates of nominal and real term premiums and, in turn, (zero coupon and forward) inflation risk premiums along the term structure. This particular application of the model produces expected real short rates and inflation rates that are somewhat static, likely because of the very short available sample of TIPS data. Nonetheless, there may be some key theoretical advantages to separate as opposed to joint estimation of the real and nominal curves. Besides, the estimates of the real and inflation risk premiums seem quite sensible. Consistent with similar approaches (Kim and Wright, 2005) , these results suggests that term premiums reached very low historical levels during the monetary policy tightening cycle that commenced in June 2004, and even more recently, some of those declines have retraced since the beginning of this year. Also, estimates of the inflation risk premium derived from the model correlate positively with common backof-the-envelope measures. This paper also examines whether the inflation risk premium produced by the model correlates with measures of inflation and monetary policy uncertainty. Depending on the particular proxy for those variables, some time-series regressions produce a statistically significant and positive correlation between inflation uncertainty and the inflation risk premium either in levels or first differences. And, at least in levels, there does appear to be a statistically significant and positive relation between Eurodollar implied volatility and the inflation risk premium estimate. Also, the small increase in option-implied monetary policy uncertainty this year has contributed minimally to the apparent increase in the inflation risk premium. Application of a three-factor model to nominal government bond yields in Germany and the United Kingdom also indicates that term premiums have increased in these countries by a similar magnitude, which suggests that the recent rise in term premiums is in part a global rather than a purely domestic phenomenon.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the broad literature on inflation risk premiums and outlines the methodology. Section 3 reviews the three-factor (Gaussian) affine term structure used to disentangle expected real rates, expected inflation, the real term premium, and the inflation risk premium from nominal forward and zero-coupon rates, and Section 4 outlines the results in the context of the current environment. Sections 5 and 6 examine the estimates with respect to other measures of the inflation risk premium and to proxies for inflation and monetary policy uncertainty, and Section 7 describes estimates of nominal term premiums in Germany and the United Kingdom vis-à-vis those in the United States. Section 8 concludes.
Recovering the Inflation Risk Premium from Term Structure Models
The inflation risk premium is one of many risk premiums that compensate investors for uncertainty, and financial economists have used a wide variety of approaches to estimate that premium. For example, some studies examine ex ante and ex post returns on nominal and inflation-indexed sovereign debt (Kandel et al., 1996) , others focus on the covariance of returns on nominal and (hypothetical) indexed government bonds in a traditional CAPM or consumption-based CAPM framework (Campbell and Shiller, 1996; Bodie, 1979) , and a few employ a much more behavioral approach (Hammond et al., 1999) . More recently, however, inflation risk premium estimates have been obtained from arbitrage-free (affine) term structure models that include both nominal interest rates and inflation (D'Amico et al., 2005) .
1 By calibrating a three-factor term structure model to the nominal and real yield curves separately, this paper is most akin to these more recent efforts. This class of so-called "arbitrage-free" models should not be confused with models, such as Ho and Lee (1986) , that exactly match a given term structure by fitting a deterministic time trend. Vasicek (1977) or Cox et al. (1985) to the nominal Treasury curve.
2 But to obtain an estimate of the inflation risk premium (and thus expected inflation), we also need to model the real yield curve or inflation directly.
Similar to (2), the real instantaneous forward rate at some horizon t, R t f , can be decomposed as
The key to the approach in this paper is that separate application of an n-factor term structure model to real yields produces estimates of the expected real future short rate at 
A Review of a Gaussian Model
To briefly review how to obtain N t p from the nominal term structure, assume, just as in Kim and Wright (2005) and similar to Langetieg (1980) 
where w is a three-dimensional Brownian motion, θ is a 3 1 × vector, κ is a lower triangular 3 3 × matrix, and Σ is a diagonal 3 3 × matrix. Also, (zero coupon) nominal bond yields, y, for a given maturity, n, at a given time, t, are an affine function of x,
where the functions ( ) A n and ( ) B n are the solutions to the bond pricing equation, which follows from the assumption that no arbitrage opportunities exist along the yield curve. 3 Note that the instantaneous short rate is the limit of (6) as n approaches zero and is also therefore a linear function of the model factors. A projection of the factors n periods ahead produces the n-period-ahead expected short rate, , n t s . Also, the instantaneous forward rate, f, for a given maturity is also an affine function of x and follows (7)
The n-period ahead instantaneous forward term premium from the model, , (5) and (6) and (8) and (9) produce nominal and real forward, zero-coupon, and instantaneous short rates along the term structure, and therefore one can easily compute (4).
5
Separate calibration of the model to nominal Treasuries and TIPS obviously implies that the relevant state vectors, t x and t x , are formally distinct. They certainly can 4 Also, the n-period zero coupon term premium is the model-implied n-period zero coupon bond yield minus the average of expected future short rates over the n-period horizon. 5 In terms of parameter estimation, as outlined in Kim and Wright (2005) and elsewhere, the model can be written in state space form in which the factors are the unobservable state variables, and the observed data are (average) weekly 1.5-, 2-, 3-, 6-, and 10-year zero-coupon rates derived from Svensson-based nominal Treasury and TIPS yield curves. (Some improvement might be made in using spline-based yields as "data" as opposed to the more parameterized Svensson estimates.) The sample for nominal (real) yield curve estimation runs from the week of November 26, 1997 26, (January 4, 2000 through the week of April 6, 2006 (July 13, 2006) . The short sample size is potentially problematic because the mean reversion (and the remaining) parameters are likely to be less reliable if estimated from shorter periods.
be positively correlated, as one indeed would expect, but this method imposes no constraints on the latent variables that drive the real and nominal yield curves. The key potential problematic issue with the implementation of (8) and (9) is the very short history of TIPS. Moreover, liquidity was poor during the early period of trading, and therefore any estimate of the real term premium likely includes a sizeable liquidity premium, which in turn biases the inflation risk premium estimate downward.
Model Results and the Contemporary Environment
The top panel of Exhibit 1 plots the nominal ten-year instantaneous forward term premium based on the nominal term structure, the real ten-year instantaneous forward term premium based on the TIPS term structure, and the model-implied forward inflation risk premium at that horizon from January 4, 2000 through July 25, 2006. Again, given the relative illiquidity of the TIPS market after the inception of trading, the real term premium likely includes a substantial liquidity premium, and therefore the inflation risk premium is probably understated for the earlier part of the sample. More recently, the inflation risk premium has increased from near sample lows in mid-2005, but it remains at a moderate level-59 basis points, very close to the sample average of 61 basis points. Returning to the middle panel of Exhibit 1, seven-year instantaneous forward term premiums, perhaps not surprisingly reflect a similar pattern, as they also have rebounded from historic lows. But, some differences are noteworthy. As indicated in Table 2 , the increase in the expected real rate since the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) began tightening policy is more pronounced than at the ten-year horizon, and the decline in term premiums is comparatively more concentrated in the real as opposed to the inflation risk premium. Also, in general, term premiums over the sample are 6 Note that the decomposition of the change from July 20, 2005 from June 24, 2004 using this method and the corresponding decomposition from Kim and Wright (2005) over the same period is largely similar, insofar as the decline in risk premiums accounts for most of the decline in forward rates over the tightening cycle. However, as noted in the last two rows of considerably lower, as the current estimate is 23 basis points, with a sample average of 13 basis points.
Finally, the bottom panel of Exhibit 1 plots the ten-year zero coupon premiums.
These estimates are less intuitive, as the inflation risk premium is largely negative from the beginning of the sample through the middle of 2002 and hovers close to zero beyond that point. These results might reflect the fact that fewer TIPS issues are used to fit the shorter end of the curve, which is a less pronounced issue with respect to distant horizon forward rates.
Comparisons with Other Measures
Comparisons with other measures of the inflation risk premium are instructive.
One back-of-the-envelope proxy refers to the difference between nearly adjacent distanthorizon nominal and real forward rates. For example, the spread between nominal (real)
forward rates at two distant horizons is often considered a rough approximation for the nominal (real) term premium, because investors likely expect the nominal (real) short rate to be unchanged far into the future. In turn, one can deduce the inflation risk premium from such estimates. This estimate is based on the assumption that investors' best guess about the trajectory of inflation between, say, nine and ten years ahead is that it will be constant, and therefore the difference between distant forward breakeven rates is the inflation risk premium. 
The Inflation Risk Premium and Proxies for Inflation and Policy Uncertainty
Besides alternative measures, another issue is whether the inflation risk premium estimates correlate with other key variables, including various proxies for inflation and monetary policy uncertainty. 10 Toward that end, Kandel et al. (1996) , each investor is unlikely to transact in all goods in the CPI basket. Given that market participants observe only a subset of prices, information about inflation is less accurate, and uncertainty is therefore perhaps greater, when relative price changes are large. The six components of the CPI used to estimate D t are food, energy, non-durables excluding food and energy, durables, rent of shelter, and services excluding energy and shelter. 13 Squaring the surprise components both insures that the proxy is positive (Both negative and positive surprises should boost general uncertainty.) and weights larger surprises more heavily. (Larger positive and negative surprises might have a non-linear effect on longer-term uncertainty.) The results reported in Table 4 are no different using core CPI or core PPI. Turning to the results, Regressions 1 and 2 in Table 4 in the premium, although the result is only significant at the 10 percent level.
Nominal Term Premium Developments in Germany and the United Kingdom
Again, the increase in inflation risk premiums in the United States since the beginning of the year does not seem to be related to any notable increase in monetary policy uncertainty. Cross-country evidence, albeit suggestive, might also be generally relevant on this score. Briefly, and just in nominal terms, if the recent increase in term premiums in the United States is primarily due either to increased monetary policy 14 This contrasts with some commentary in the contemporary popular press that suggests just such a link. For example, see "Bernanke, Fukui, Trichet Can't Match Greenspan's Rate Clarity," posted on Bloomberg on July 10, 2006, which reported that "(b)y some estimates, confusion over central banks' intentions has raised yields more than 20 basis points above where they would otherwise be" over the course of the year. uncertainty or idiosyncratic developments related to the central bank, then one might expect smaller relative increases in other countries, all else equal.
Of course, controlling for all relevant variables across cases is impossible, but to consider this issue, I calibrated the same three-factor model used to fit the nominal and real yields curves in the United States, as outlined in (5) - (6), 17 to fitted government bond yield curves for Germany and the United Kingdom. 18 Table 5 Also, although the increase in forward rates was smaller in the United Kingdom, the model nonetheless suggests that the back-up in rates so far this year owes primarily to an increase in the nominal term premium. In addition, the share of the drop in forward rates due to declines in term premiums since the inception of Federal Reserve tightening in June 2004 is largely comparable across these three cases. Therefore, although the comparisons are naturally only suggestive and global debt markets are closely 17 Calibration across markets perhaps particularly raises the issue of alternative restrictions of the Gaussian parameters or even different stochastic processes outside the Gaussian framework. For example, application of Ornstein-Ulhenbeck processes, which potentially permit negative nominal interest rates, might be problematic in cases, such as Japan, in which the zero bound persistently looms during a significant portion of the sample period. For an empirical analysis of affine term structure models, see Dai and Singleton (2000) . For alternative stochastic process, such as jump-diffusion, see Das (2002) , Piazzesi (2005) , or Durham (2006) . 18 The yields curves for Germany and the United Kingdom are estimated by precisely the same procedure as for nominal and real United States Treasury securities. I estimate the parameters for data on German (United Kingdom) government bond yields using weekly data from November 26, 1997 26, (January 4, 2000 through April 6, 2006 (April 6, 2006 . interrelated, these results are consistent with the view that the increase in term premiums thus far this year is perhaps just as much a global as a domestic financial phenomenon.
Discussion
In summary, this paper decomposes nominal interest rates into expected real rates, expected inflation rates, real risk premiums, and inflation risk premiums by calibrating standard three-factor affine term structure models separately to the nominal Treasury and TIPS yield curves. The key caveats with the procedure regard not the model per se, but the parameter estimation and the short sample on real yields. As noted by Kim and Orphanides (2005) , in the absence of survey data, a short sample period biases the estimates of the persistence of the factors downwards, and this effect is especially severe with the TIPS data. In short, this particular application of the model seems comparatively biased toward attributing too much of the movement in forward rates to term premiums.
But despite some drawbacks, there may be substantial theoretical advantages in calibrating the model separately to the nominal and real yield curves, as opposed to joint estimation. Joint estimation as conducted by D'Amico et al. (2005) and Kim and Wright (2005) requires that the same three factors drive both the nominal and real term structures, a potentially limiting feature that this estimate avoids.
In addition, the results, both in terms of the current level (at least at more distant horizons) and the time variation of the inflation risk premium, seem broadly consistent with alternative back-of-the-envelope measures and proxies for uncertainty. Also, some tentative inferences regarding the current interest rate environment are noteworthy.
Namely, the apparent increase in the inflation risk premium since the beginning of 2006 
